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Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on coherent states is well known for its implementation
simplicity, but it suffers from loss-dependent attacks based on optimal unambiguous state discrim-
ination. Crucially, previous research has suggested that coherent-state QKD is limited to short
distances, typically below 100 km assuming standard optical fiber loss and system parameters. In
this work, we propose a six-coherent-state phase-encoding QKD protocol that is able to tolerate
the total loss of up to 38 dB assuming realistic system parameters, and up to 56 dB loss assuming
zero noise. The security of the protocol is calculated using a recently developed security proof tech-
nique based on semi-definite programming, which assumes only the inner-product information of the
encoded coherent states, the expected statistics, and that the measurement is basis-independent.
Our results thus suggest that coherent-state QKD could be a promising candidate for high-speed
provably-secure QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is one of the most
established quantum information technologies to date.
Its basic goal is to distribute secret keys between two
remote users (called Alice and Bob) embedded in an un-
trusted network. Importantly, unlike conventional key
distribution methods, QKD is provably-secure and can
be safely used with any cryptographic protocol that re-
quires long-term security assurance. For an overview of
QKD and its recent developments, we refer the interested
reader to Refs. [2–4].
In prepare-and-measure QKD, there are generally two
classes of coherent-state protocols, namely those that are
based on phase randomization and those that give the
phase reference information to Eve (the adversary). In
the former, one first uniformly randomizes the phase of
the coherent state |√µeiθ〉 to create a mixture of photon
number states, i.e.,
ρµ =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|√µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ| = e−µ
∑
n≥0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n|. (1)
This mixture follows a Poisson distribution and emits
a single-photon state with probability µe−µ and multi-
photon states with probability 1− e−µ(1+µ), where µ is
the mean photon number of the signal. Then, by using
a statistical technique called the decoy-state method to
bound the fraction of detected single-photon states, one
can get secret key rates that are comparable to that with
a true single-photon source [5–7]. In the following, we
shall refer to phase-randomized coherent-state QKD as
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decoy-state QKD since they often mean the same proto-
col in practice.
In the case that the phase reference is given to Eve,
she no longer sees a mixture of photon number states,
but a coherent state |αx〉 that is randomly drawn from
a set of possible preparations {|αx〉}x, which is necessar-
ily linearly independent. Crucially, based on this phase
information, Eve can optimize her attack strategy to
distinguish between different subsets of the preparation
set [8–10]. In the worst case scenario (given the chan-
nel loss is sufficiently high), she can determine the exact
value of x by performing unambiguous state discrimi-
nation. For this reason, most existing security analyses
of non-phase-randomized coherent-state QKD show that
the tolerable channel loss is significantly below that of
decoy-state QKD [11, 12]. For example, assuming stan-
dard experimental settings, we find that the maximum
distance (fiber length) of the phase-encoding coherent-
state QKD protocol is generally shorter than 100 km,
while decoy-state QKD can achieve up to about 250 km
(see the simulation results below).
However, in practice, it may be more attractive to con-
sider non-phase-randomized coherent-state QKD. The
main reason is that the set of security assumptions for
non-phase-randomized coherent-state QKD is typically
less stringent than that of decoy-state QKD. To appre-
ciate this point, we note that it is very important for
decoy-state QKD systems to completely randomize the
phase of their quantum signals. If this assumption is not
met, then there could be serious security loopholes [9, 10].
Recently, it has been pointed out that the requirement
of ideal continuous phase randomization can be replaced
by discrete phase randomization [13]. This work rep-
resents an important step towards making decoy-state
QKD more practical, however it introduces additional
complexity into the security analysis, which can be tricky
when considering finite-length keys. Thus, for practi-
2cal reasons, it may still be of interest to investigate new
coherent-state QKD protocols that can distribute secret
keys over longer distances.
In order to achieve good secret key rates using non-
phase-randomized coherent states, it is important to have
a tight estimation of Eve’s information about the se-
cret key. While in principle one could obtain a tight
estimation of Eve’s information by considering all the
possible eavesdropping strategies, it is computationally
intractable to fully characterize them, especially if the
underlying Hilbert space dimension is unknown. To re-
solve this technical difficulty, here we employ the numer-
ical tool introduced in Ref. [14] to bound Eve’s informa-
tion, which roughly speaking, converts the characteriza-
tion problem of Eve’s strategies into a tractable hierarchy
of semi-definite programs (SDP). It has been shown in
Ref. [14] that the SDP method provides a tighter bound
on Eve’s information as compared to existing methods
that use the so-called quantum coin method [12]. Ad-
ditionally, the SDP method is semi-device-independent
(SDI) [15–20], namely the detailed characterization of
Bob’s measurements is no longer necessary, but differ-
ent to previous SDI which based on dimension or en-
ergy assumption, the analysis here is made based on the
known inner product information of the coherent states.
As such, the security certified by this method is robust
against a large class of quantum device flaws and imper-
fections.
In this work, we propose a six-coherent-state proto-
col and show that it offers significant advantages in both
secret key rate and transmission distance over existing
coherent-state QKD protocols [12, 14]. The organization
of the paper is as follows: in Sec. II, for pedagogical rea-
sons, we first review a standard coherent-state QKD pro-
tocol that encodes the secret key into the relative phase
of the coherent states. In Sec. III, we first introduce a
six-coherent-state protocol which allows the test coherent
states to use different mean photon number from that of
the key states. Then, we use the method introduced in
Ref. [14] to derive the secret key rate of the protocol and
simulate its expected performance using standard exper-
imental parameters. Finally, we conclude our findings in
Sec. IV.
II. PHASE-ENCODING BB84
COHERENT-STATE QKD
In this section, we first review a popular coherent-state
QKD protocol, which is inspired by the celebrated Ben-
nett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD [1]. Here, the proto-
col encodes the secret bit into the relative phase of two
coherent states, where the first coherent state is the sig-
nal state (the modulated signal) and the second coherent
state is the reference state (fixed and whose phase refer-
ence is given to Eve). More specifically, Alice sends one
of four states randomly:
|0˜key〉 = |α〉R ⊗ |α〉S ,
|1˜key〉 = |α〉R ⊗ |−α〉S ,
|0˜test〉 = |α〉R ⊗ |iα〉S ,
|1˜test〉 = |α〉R ⊗ |−iα〉S , (2)
where the phase of α is relative to a fixed classical phase
reference frame that Eve can access. Here, the subscript
S and R denote the signal state and reference state, re-
spectively. Then, Bob measures the signal he receives
in either key basis or test basis. When Bob measures
the signal in key basis, he combines the two modes in
an interferometer, and directs modes a0,key, a1,key to two
different threshold photon detectors, where
a0,key = (aR + aS)/
√
2,
a1,key = (aR − aS)/
√
2. (3)
In ideal case, if Alice sends |0˜key〉 to Bob and he measures
in the key basis, detector D0 (model a0,key) will click
(with some probability depending on the channel loss )
and detector D1 (model a1,key) will not click. Likewise,
if Alice sends |1˜key〉, then detector D0 will not click and
detector D1 will click with some probability. Hence, Bob
can determine the bit value that Alice encodes in key
basis. When Bob measures in the test basis, he directs
modes a0,test, a1,test to the detectors, where
a0,test = (aR + iaS)/
√
2,
a1,test = (aR − iaS)/
√
2. (4)
Similarly, Bob can determine the bit value that Alice
encodes in test basis. Then, Alice and Bob retain only
the successful events in which they choose the same basis
through public communication. After performing error
correction step and privacy amplification step, Alice and
Bob obtain the final secure key.
To prove the security of the protocol, one can either use
the quantum coin method [12] or the SDP method pro-
posed in Ref. [14]. It has been demonstrated in the latter
that the SDP method provides a tighter security analy-
sis. Interestingly, Ref. [14] also suggested that it may
be useful to vary the test coherent states. In particular,
the authors demonstrated that, in the case of coherent-
one-way QKD, it is possible to significantly extend the
key distribution distance by varying the intensity of the
test coherent state in the protocol. In light of this ob-
servation, we propose the following phase-encoding QKD
protocol.
III. SIX-COHERENT-STATE QKD
Here, we detail our proposed six-coherent-state pro-
tocol, and illustrate one of its possible implementation
schemes in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the six-coherent-state QKD protocol. The intensity modulator (IM) and phase modulator 1 (PM1) is
positioned in Alice’s site to prepare the intended coherent states, |ψz〉. Phase modulator 2 (PM2) in Bob’s site is used to
randomly rotate the phase of the signal signal by 0 or pi. To avoid reducing the intensities of the coherent states, we can either
use polarization multiplexing method as shown in the figure, or deploy active optical switches.
Preparation.-Alice randomly prepares one of those six
quantum code states {|ψz〉}6z=1: |ψ1〉 = |
√
µ1〉R|
√
µ1〉S ,|ψ2〉 = |√µ1〉R|−
√
µ1〉S , |ψ3〉 = |
√
µ2〉R|i
√
µ2〉S , |ψ4〉 =
|√µ2〉R|−i
√
µ2〉S , |ψ5〉 = |
√
µ3〉R|eiθ1
√
µ4〉S , |ψ6〉 =
|√µ3〉R|e−iθ2
√
µ4〉S , shown in Fig. 2. Then, she sends
it to Bob via the quantum channel. The states |ψ1〉 and
|ψ2〉 are used to extract keys, while the rest are used to
estimate Eve’s information about the secret key. In this
case, the key bit is encoded in the relative phase of the
signal state and reference state. Here, the intensities and
phases are free parameters, which will be used to opti-
mize the secret key rate.
FIG. 2. Distribution of coherent states in phase space. The
key basis represents the real part of the space. Here, the
intensities and phases {θ1, θ2} are given by the optimization:
in fact, the optimization suggests that the optimal encoding
scheme is given by µ1 = µ2 = µ3 and θ1 = θ2 = pi/2.
Measurement.-Upon receiving the state, Bob directs it to
the interferometer to recover the bit information. We use
positive-operator valued measures (POVMs) to describe
Bob’s interference operations: Bob randomly performs
one of two possible POVMs denoted by {Bby}, where
y ∈ {0, 1} represents basis choice. Taking signal loss
and detection inefficiency into account, each measure-
ment has three possible outcomes b ∈ {0, 1, ∅}, where ∅
represents the empty detection event. In the event that
both detectors click, Bob assigns a random bit to it. Ad-
ditionally, we require that Bob’s measurements satisfy
basis-independent assumption: measurement operators
corresponding to detection loss are the same for both
measurement settings, i.e. B∅0 = B
∅
1 . This is to ensure
that the probability of detecting a signal is independent
of Bob’s measurement choice, which is necessary to rule
out detection side-channel attacks exploiting the channel
loss [21]. Thus Bob’s three-outcome POVM is equiva-
lent to a two-outcome POVM that determines the key
bit, preceded by a basis-independent “filter”.
Parameter estimation and key distillation.-Alice and Bob
announce their basis choices through the public channel
and decide if the error rates fulfill certain thresholds. If
the test is successful, then Alice and Bob proceed with
error correction and privacy amplification to extract a
secret key.
To compute the security of the protocol, we can use a
certain entropic uncertainty relation for quantum mem-
ories [22] and Fano’s inequality [23]. Using these, it can
be shown that the asymptotic secret key rate of QKD
against collective attacks is
R∞key ≥ max{0, pdet(1− h2(ebit)− h2(eph))}, (5)
where ebit and eph are the bit error rate and phase error
rate of the key basis, pdet is the probability of detection in
key basis, and h2(·) is the binary entropy function. The
extension to general attacks is then achieved by using
proof techniques like the post-selection technique [24] or
entropy accumulation theorem [25]. These results imply
that it is sufficient to consider security against collective
attacks.
4A. SDP optimization problem for bounding Eve’s
information
From Eq. (5), we see that the secret key rate is ob-
tained once we know the detection probability, bit error
rate, and the phase error rate. To obtain these values,
we first consider that Alice, Bob and Eve share a purified
tripartite state |Φ〉 after the transmission,
|Φ〉 = |+〉A|φ1〉BE + |−〉A|φ2〉BE√
2
. (6)
where Eve’s set of possible operations has been consid-
ered in |φ1〉BE and |φ2〉BE . Conditioned on Bob observ-
ing a successful detection, the bit error rate of the key
basis is then given by
ebit =
〈Φ|(|+〉〈+| ⊗ B10 + |−〉〈−| ⊗B00)|Φ〉
pdet
=
〈φ1|B10 |φ1〉+ 〈φ2|B00 |φ2〉
2pdet
. (7)
The phase error rate in this case is the bit error rate
that Alice and Bob would have observed if |Φ〉 has been
measured in the {|+i〉〈+i|, |−i〉〈−i|} basis by Alice and
B1 basis by Bob. Mathematically, this is given by
eph =
〈Φ|(|+i〉〈+i| ⊗B01 + |−i〉〈−i| ⊗B11)|Φ〉
2pdet
=
1
2
− Im
{ 〈φ1|B01 |φ2〉 − 〈φ1|B11 |φ2〉
2pdet
}
. (8)
One can see that pdet and ebit are experimentally acces-
sible, while the phase error rate eph, which related to
Eve’s information about the secret bit is not. To get a
tight estimation of eph, in principle one should optimize
over Eve’s set of possible operations, namely captured in
the transformed states |φ1〉BE and |φ2〉BE under the con-
straints imposed by the expected statistics. However, as
we mentioned earlier, this type of characterization prob-
lem is often intractable or impossible to solve directly.
Here, we employ the numerical tool introduced in
Ref. [14] to estimate the phase error rate, which converts
the initial characterization problem into a hierarchy of
semi-definite programs. More specifically, each hierarchy
forms a convex set which outer-approximates the quan-
tum set. Importantly, by going to higher hierarchies,
the approximation becomes tighter. The quantum set
here means the set of measurement statistics compatible
with the set of prepared quantum signals and Bob’s mea-
surements. Thus, in using this method, we can optimize
over the various convex sets to bound Eve’s information,
which in turn, provides a lower bound on the secret key
rate of the protocol.
With this SDP method, the detailed characterization
of the quantum signals and measurements, including
their dimension, is no longer required in the analysis.
Therefore, the transmission channel can be seen as an
isometric evolution in higher dimension that takes the
FIG. 3. The Gram matrix under six quantum states and the
operators set of S = {I, B00 , B
0
1 , B
∅}. We have assumed that
B∅0 = B
∅
1 = B
∅. Actually this matrix is equivalent to the
Gram matrix formed by the set {B00 , B
1
0 , B
0
1 , B
1
1 , B
∅}, since
the correlations related to B1y can be represented by I−B
0
y −
B∅. The reason we consider S is that it can reduce the matrix
dimension.
initial quantum signal state |ψz〉 to some pure output
signal state |φz〉, which is shared between the receivers
Bob and the network environment (possibly Eve). The
inner product of the output states is preserved after the
transmission, i.e. 〈φz |φ′z〉 = 〈ψz|ψ′z〉 = λzz′ . In the same
way, the POVMs {Bby} can be assumed as projective mea-
surements in higher dimension. Then, we say that the
probabilities of observing outcomes b given setting y and
z admits a quantum system, if there exist a quantum
state |φz〉 and operators Bby such that
p(b|y, z) = 〈φz |Bby|φz〉. (9)
where the operators {Bby} follow the properties:
(i) for any y,BbyB
b′
y = 0, ∀ b 6= b′,
(ii) ΣbB
b
y = I,
(iii) (Bby)
2 = Bby = (B
b
y)
†.
A family of necessary conditions satisfied by the quan-
tum observed probabilities thus can be introduced. De-
note S = {S1, ..., Sm} as a finite set ofm operators, where
each element is a linear combination of products of {Bby}.
We define the nm× nm block Gram matrix G:
G = Σnz,z′=1G
zz′ ⊗ |ez〉〈ez′ |,
with, Gzz
′
(i,j) = 〈φz |S†i · Sj |φz′〉
(10)
in which Gzz
′
(i,j) is defined as the inner-product of the vec-
tors 〈φz |S†i and Sj|φz′ 〉, for all z, z′ ∈ [n], i, j ∈ [m].
Gzz
′
(i,j) is the ij-entry of the matrix G
zz′ and {|ez〉}nz=1
5represents the standard orthonormal basis of Rn. Ev-
idently, the matrix G is Hermitian and positive-semi-
definite (PSD) [26] by definition.
Taking S = {I, B00 , B01 , B∅} for example, the matrix
G is depicted in Fig. 3. The whole matrix G is parti-
tioned into 6 × 6 sub-blocks {Gzz′}zz′ by the classifier
z, where each sub-block has size 4 × 4 and is illustrated
in Fig. 4. The entries of every sub-block Gzz
′
partly
FIG. 4. The sub-block of the Gram matrix.
reflect the properties of (i) - (iii) satisfied by the opera-
tors and the overlaps of the signal states. For instance,
property (ii) implies that we can introduce the iden-
tity operator I and remove one of the operators; prop-
erty (i) implies Gzz
′
2,2 = 〈φz |B00B00 |φz′〉 = 〈φz |B00 |φz′〉 and
Gzz
′
2,4 = 〈φz |B00B∅|φz′〉 = 0; meanwhile the property (iii)
implies 〈φz |BbyBb
′
y |φz〉 = (〈φz |Bb
′
y B
b
y|φz〉)†. In addition,
since the overlaps of the code states are known, we have
〈φz |I|φz′ 〉 = λzz′ .
From the definition, each set S of operators yields a
different Gram matrix G and different linear constraints.
The choice of a particular S may seem arbitrary, but not
all operators in S are independent. Moreover, they can
be organized in a hierarchical structure, such that S can
be defined inductively,
S1 = {I, Bby}
S2 = S1
⋃
{BbyBb
′
y′}
S3 = S2
⋃
{BbyBb
′
y′B
b
y}
S4 = . . .
(11)
Thus, with each increase of the hierarchy, not only the
dimension of the Gram matrix becomes larger, but also
more new linear constraints are introduced. For example,
for S2 : 〈φz |B00B01 |φz′〉 = 〈φz |B00 ·B00B01 |φz′〉,
〈φz |B00B01 ·B00 |φz′〉 = 〈φz |B00 ·B01B00 |φz′〉,
〈φz |B00B01 ·B01B00 |φz′〉 = 〈φz |B00B01B00 |φz′〉, . . .
for S3 : 〈φz |B00B01 · B00B01 |φz′ 〉
= 〈φz |B00 · B01B00B01 |φz′〉
= 〈φz |B00B01B00 · B01 |φz′〉,
〈φz |B00B01 ·B00B01B00 |φz′〉
= 〈φz |B00B01B00 · B01B00 |φz′ 〉, . . .
We denote the quantum set by Q(λ), which is formed
by the probability distributions admitting a quantum
system and the overlaps of the code states. Moreover,
let the set of probability distributions defined by hier-
archy of step n be denoted as Q(λ)n. Then, we have
that Q(λ) ⊆ Q(λ)n. In fact, it has been demonstrated
in Ref. [14] that in the limit of n (i.e., n → ∞), Q(λ)n
converges to Q(λ). Ultimately, this means that the secret
key rate obtained by the SDP can only be tighter when
considering higher hierarchies.
To compute Eq. (5), we thus only need to maximize
eph using SDP under the conditions that pdet and ebit
are fixed to some experimental model. In particular, the
SDP problem for maximizing the phase error rate is:
maximize : eph
subject to : 〈φz |φz′〉 = λzz′ , ∀z, z′
G ≥ 0,
Tr(FkG) = pk,
Tr(RkG) = gk,
ebit, pdet fixed to experimental model
(12)
where Fk’s and Rk’s are constant matrices. Note that
Fk’s are used to pick up the terms in G which are associ-
ated with the observed distributions p(b|x, y); meanwhile
Rk’s are used to pick up the terms in G which are associ-
ated with the linear constraints induced by the quantum
operators and states.
B. Numerical simulation
We simulate the secret key rate of the protocol using a
realistic model, which includes total loss (including chan-
nel loss and detection efficiency), misalignment error of
the optics, and the dark counts of single photon detectors.
As Bob uses two threshold detectors, there are four pos-
sible outcomes when he measures a signal. By mapping
double clicks randomly into 0 or 1, Bob’s measurement
realizes a POVM with three outcomes: 0, 1 and incon-
clusive. Note that the double clicks are interpreted as
key bits [12, 27]. In order to obtain a realistic detection
model, we consider the error model illustrated in Fig. 5.
FIG. 5. Statistical model considering dark count and mis-
alignment error. Where y ∈ {0, 1} represents the basis
choice, C0 and C1 (N0 and N1) denote the event of detection
D0 and D1 click (do not click), respectively. The notation
"b" ∈ {"0", "1", "∅"} represents the outcome without consid-
ering the misalignment error, while b ∈ {0, 1, ∅} denotes the
outcome considering the misalignment error.
6TABLE I. The statistics of each POVM for each coming
states.
B00 B
1
0 B
∅
y B
0
1 B
1
1
|φ1〉 P (0, 1, 0) P (1, 1, 0) P (∅, 1, y) P (0, 1, 1) P (1, 1, 1)
|φ2〉 P (0, 2, 0) P (1, 2, 0) P (∅, 2, y) P (0, 2, 1) P (1, 2, 1)
|φ3〉 P (0, 3, 0) P (1, 3, 0) P (∅, 3, y) P (0, 3, 1) P (1, 3, 1)
|φ4〉 P (0, 4, 0) P (1, 4, 0) P (∅, 4, y) P (0, 4, 1) P (1, 4, 1)
|φ5〉 P (0, 5, 0) P (1, 5, 0) P (∅, 5, y) P (0, 5, 1) P (1, 5, 1)
|φ6〉 P (0, 6, 0) P (1, 6, 0) P (∅, 6, y) P (0, 6, 1) P (1, 6, 1)
We assume that the detector dark count rate is pdc =
10−7 and misalignment error rate is ε = 2%. For a given
total loss 1− η, the probability of detectors clicking and
not clicking without misalignment error are
Nj(z, y) =(1− pdc)[
〈√ηφz |R + (−1)je−iy
pi
2 〈√ηφz |S√
2
|0〉
〈0| |
√
ηφz〉R + (−1)jeiy
pi
2 |√ηφz〉S√
2
],
Cj(z, y) =1−Nj(z, y),
(13)
where j ∈ {0, 1} represents detector D0 and D1, y ∈
{0, 1} is Bob’s basis choice, |φz〉S and |φz〉R denote the
signal and reference portion of the state |φz〉 respectively.
Let T ("b", z, y) denotes the probability of getting the
outcome "b". We have that
T ("0", z, y) = C0(z, y)N1(z, y) +
C0(z, y)C1(z, y)
2
,
T ("1", z, y) = C1(z, y)N0(z, y) +
C0(z, y)C1(z, y)
2
,
T ("∅", z, y) = N0(z, y)N1(z, y).
(14)
Considering the misalignment error ε, the probabilities
of Bby are
P (0, z, y) = (1− ε)T ("0", z, y) + εT ("1", z, y),
P (1, z, y) = (1− ε)T ("1", z, y) + εT ("0", z, y),
P (∅, z, y) = T ("∅", z, y).
(15)
Thus, the statistics of each POVM measurement on each
coming states can be evaluated, as shown in Tab. I. Ac-
cordingly, the probability of detecting a signal pdet for
key basis and the corresponding bit error rate ebit are
then given by
pdet = T ("0", 1, 0) + T ("1", 1, 0)
= 1− (1− pdc)2e−2η|α|2 ,
ebit =
εT ("0", 1, 0)+ (1 − ε)T ("1", 1, 0)
pdet
=
pdc
2 + ε(1− pdc) + (pdc2 − ε)(1− pdc)e−2η|α|
2
pdet
.
(16)
Subsequently, we maximize eph over the set of com-
patible probabilities using the first level of the hierarchy
and the results of the numerical optimization with errors
(blue curve) and without errors (rose curve) are shown
in Fig. 6. In the absence of errors, the tolerable total loss
is extended to more than 55 dB, which is extremely close
to the collective beam-splitting attack bound (an upper
bound on the secret key rate). This suggests that the
six-coherent-state QKD protocol is pretty robust against
the total loss in the absence of errors. Taking into ac-
count practical errors, the tolerable total loss reaches up
to 38 dB, which is significantly higher than previous re-
sults [12, 14] (around 23, 25 dB respectively) assuming
the same error model specified in Fig. 5. As compared
with the protocol in Ref. [14], additional two test states
are included in our protocol to give better characteri-
zation of the quantum system between Alice and Bob.
Thus, a tighter bound on Eve’s information could be ob-
tained.
Moreover, through the optimization, we observe that
the secret key rate is optimized when µ1 = µ2 = µ3 and
θ1 = θ2 = pi/2. This is expected since µ1 = µ2 = µ3
corresponds to larger overlaps between the six coherent
states, which imply that it will be more challenging for
Eve to distinguish them, meanwhile θ1 = θ2 = pi/2 pro-
vides more characterization of the test basis (B1), and
thus, resulting in a higher secret key rate. Therefore,
in practice, one has to only modulate the amplitude be-
tween two levels (µ1 and µ4) which makes our protocol
highly practical and suitable for high-speed implementa-
tion.
For completeness, we also plot the secret key rate,
obtained using decoy-state method, of the protocol in
Ref. [28] that is based on time-bin encoding of phase-
randomised coherent states. The asymptotic secret key
rate is estimated using the formula given in Ref. [31],
without taking into account of the statistical corrections
of finite-length keys. Considering the same simulation
parameters (i.e., total loss , misalignment error and dark
count rate), the plot of secret key rate against loss of
the decoy-state QKD protocol is shown in Fig. 6. The
comparison shows that secret key rate of our protocol
is comparable to that of the one-decoy-state protocol in
low loss regime. Specifically, the key rates differ by only
one order of magnitude in the region when the loss is less
than 25 dB. For further comparison, we also simulated
the optimized secret key rates of BB84 protocol with 2
decoy states and infinite number of decoy states, and our
protocol still shows appreciable performance in the short
distance regime.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, on the one hand, phase randomization is
a critical assumption made in the analysis of most coher-
ent state QKD protocols and any deviation from prepar-
ing perfectly phase-randomized coherent states may pose
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FIG. 6. For the key rate simulation, we assume a detector dark count rate of pdc = 10
−7 and a misalignment error rate of
ε = 2%. The comparison is based on the same error model and same experiment parameters. The protocol of BB84 plus decoy
technology we considered here comes from Ref. [28]. The one-decoy scenario of Ref. [28] and our six-coherent-state protocol
both have two key states, and four test states. And we have less test states compared to more-decoy states BB84 protocol.
The optimization is carried out with the MATLAB packages YALMIP [29] and the SDP solvers SEDUMI [30].
serious threats of a security breach. On the other
hand, existing analysis on non-phase-randomized coher-
ent states are overly pessimistic and yield secret key rates
that are inferior to alternative protocols based on the
decoy-state method. In this paper, we presented and an-
alyzed the security of a six-coherent-state phase encoding
QKD protocol based on non-phase-randomized coherent
states. Our analysis requires fewer assumptions on both
the quantum state preparation and measurement pro-
cesses as it relies solely on the overlaps of the code states
as well as the observed statistics. Simulating with real-
istic experimental model (dark count rate of 10−7 and
misalignment error of 2%), our protocol can tolerate a
total loss of up to 38 dB, which is much higher than
previous works. Moreover, we observed that the secure
key rates of our protocol are comparable with the BB84
decoy-state protocol in the low loss regime. In addition
to the improved key rates, our protocol only requires the
modulation of six relative phases and two amplitudes,
which is easy to implement. Hence, we have shown that
one could implement coherent state QKD without per-
forming phase randomization and yield comparable key
rates with other known protocols.
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